My assigned task is to lay out the shape of my father's life and faith. This is daunting, but it is also a privilege because I loved him and admired him, and his life has been central in shaping my own. I am speaking also on behalf of my mother, my three sisters, Bridget, Louise and Ellie, and our children, Catherine and Andrew, Sam and Anisa, Hannah and Matty.

The purpose of this work is to supply readers, and the author has in mind chiefly college students, with a competent and objective presentation and reasoned evaluation of the major conflicting "philosophies of life" current in the contemporary world. The work opens with a chapter dealing with the "moral climate" of our day. Binkley sees this as a climate typified by the demise of traditional certitudes and the emergence of a relativistic attitude toward human values, a relativism that received its (...) most sustained treatment at the hands of Edward Westermarck. He sees it likewise as permeated by a pragmatic mind concerned with workable and realizable goals, not with eternal certitudes. And he sees it, finally, as a climate in which many are seeking to establish new ultimates to take the place of those that have been the victims of a new understanding of man and the universe. In subsequent chapters Binkley examines in some detail the philosophies of life or value systems competing for man’s allegiance today. Among these he includes the following: the communist vision of Marx, the psychoanalytic humanism of Freud and Fromm, the Kierkegaardian projection of the authentic Christian and Nietzsche’s proposal of the Overman who creates his own values, the humanistic existentialism of Sartre, and the religious existentialism advocated by Barth, Tillich, and such advocates of the "new morality" as Bishop Robinson and Joseph Fletcher. Finally, he examines the meta-ethical views of men such as Toulmin and Hare, discerning in their proposals some useful therapeutic devices for making some kind of intelligent choice among the competing value systems presented to contemporary man. In a final chapter Binkley stresses that the choice of a way of a life, of a basic moral posture, is a choice that only the individual can make after careful consideration and evaluation of pertinent data. All in all, his is a very useful and intelligent work, packed with information.—W. E. M. (shrink)

In an increasingly complex military operating environment, next generation wargaming platforms can reduce risk, decrease operating costs, and improve overall outcomes. Novel Artificial Intelligence enabled wargaming approaches, based on software platforms with multimodal interaction and visualization capacity, are essential to provide the decision-making flexibility and adaptability required to meet current and emerging realities of warfighting. We highlight three areas of development for future warfighter-machine interfaces: AI-directed decisional guidance, computationally informed decision-making, and realistic representations of decision spaces. Progress in these areas (...) will enable development of effective human-AI collaborative decision-making, to meet the increasing scale and complexity of today’s battlespace. (shrink)

In "moral arguments" ("mind", 1958), Philippa foot displayed what she claimed to be a deduction of an evaluative conclusion from a non-Evaluative premise. In "freedom and reason", R m hare attacks foot-Style deductions on two grounds: he first offers a "reductio", Comparing them to a racist deduction; he then offers an explanation of where all of these arguments go awry. I argue in my paper's first part that hare's explanation rests upon a defective criterion of entailment. In passing (...) I show how this counts against certain noncognitivist arguments that purport to show that moral judgments cannot be factual. In the second part I show that foot-Style deductions--And the racist deduction as well--Are either unsound or else superfluous to the naturalist's enterprise. From this I draw certain morals as to what conditions a successful naturalism must satisfy. (shrink)

Is morality too difficult for human beings? Kant said that it was, except with God's assistance. Contemporary moral philosophers have usually discussed the question without reference to Christian doctrine, and have either diminished the moral demand, exaggerated human moral capacity, or tried to find a substitute in nature for God's assistance. This book looks at these philosophers--from Kant and Kierkegaard to Swinburne, Russell, and R.M. Hare--and the alternative in Christianity.

This study aims at measuring the level of unacceptability of certain unethical behaviours for educators in accounting/finance as well as marketing/management in their various roles. The research was conducted utilising a quantitative approach based on the Integrated Social Contracts Theory in order to compare norms of ethically acceptable/unacceptable behaviours of A/F and M/M educators in the context of Kuwait. The population for this study consisted of educators from A/F and M/M from different Business Schools in Kuwait. The results of the (...) study indicate there is general agreement on unacceptable behaviours in academia between the two groups; however, in general, A/F faculty tend to rate nearly all unethical behaviors as slightly more unacceptable than do M/M faculty. While this may possibly indicate that A/F faculty are slightly more ethical, more likely it reflects different ways of perceiving the world among quantitatively vs. qualitatively-oriented faculty. We also compare the results to a prior similar survey conducted by Siegel and Jackson. It seems that the perceived ethics of behaviours differs somewhat among educators in different parts of the world. This study is expected to assist the development of an ethical code in Kuwaiti academe. This in turn will help students to learn about codes of ethics which will govern their future conduct as professionals. (shrink)

_God and Morality_ evaluates the ethical theories of four principle philosophers, Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Kant, and R.M. Hare. Uses their thinking as the basis for telling the story of the history and development of ethical thought more broadly Focuses specifically on their writings on virtue, will, duty, and consequence Concentrates on the theistic beliefs to highlight continuity of philosophical thought.

_God and Morality_ evaluates the ethical theories of four principle philosophers, Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Kant, and R.M. Hare. Uses their thinking as the basis for telling the story of the history and development of ethical thought more broadly Focuses specifically on their writings on virtue, will, duty, and consequence Concentrates on the theistic beliefs to highlight continuity of philosophical thought.

_God and Morality_ evaluates the ethical theories of four principle philosophers, Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Kant, and R.M. Hare. Uses their thinking as the basis for telling the story of the history and development of ethical thought more broadly Focuses specifically on their writings on virtue, will, duty, and consequence Concentrates on the theistic beliefs to highlight continuity of philosophical thought.

In my book God’s Call1 I gave an historical account of the debate within twentieth century analytic philosophy between moral realism and expressivism. Moral realism is the view that moral properties like goodness or cruelty exist independently of our making judgements that things have such properties. Such judgements are, on this theory, objectively true when the things referred to have the specified properties and objectively false when they do not. Expressivism is the view that when a person makes a moral (...) judgment, she is expressing emotion or desire or will. I used the term ‘orectic’ to refer to these mental states, because we do not have in English a sufficiently general term. In God’s Call, I started with a moral realist whom I called a ‘platonist’, G. E. Moore, and then I traced the argument through the emotivists, A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, and the prescriptivist, R. M. Hare, and Iris Murdoch, whom I called a ‘humble platonist’, and J. L. Mackie’s ‘error theory’, and John McDowell, whose theory I call ‘disposition theory’, and David Brink, the ‘new-wave realist’, and Allan Gibbard, who calls his own theory ‘ norm expressivism ’. My project was to collect together the concessions that the two sides of the debate have made to each other over the course of this history, and then to construct a position which molds these concessions into a single coherent theory. I called this theory ‘prescriptive realism’. (shrink)

Hare argues that one exception to the rule that no imperative conclusion can validly be drawn from premises that do not contain at least one imperative are ‘hypothetical imperatives’ because their content, though of an imperative, is that of a statement implicit in the premises. He then argues that no ethical theory can be a ‘Cartesian’ moral system, i.e. consist of particular duties derived from self‐evident principles alone. Finally, three arguments are given why description can never be prescription, and (...) thus that no imperative can be inferred from indicative alone. (shrink)

Hare argues that ‘good’ is not a simple property as e.g. ‘red’, for unlike ‘red’, ‘good’ does not always refer to a common property whenever it is applied. The same holds for ‘instrumentally good’. At the same time, though, we are able to learn the use of ‘good’ without being taught what in a particular class of objects entitles us to apply ‘good’ to a member of that class. Hence, Hare claims, all uses of ‘good’ must have a (...) common meaning, but different criteria of application. (shrink)

Hare presents his own position, a theory that incorporates all the truths of the other theories that have been discussed, together with ‘prescriptive logic’, which is what makes rationality in moral thinking possible. Hare calls this position ‘universal prescriptivism’, and he identifies it as an adaptation of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Universal Prescriptivism gives a completely formal account of the meanings of moral words such as ‘ought’; i.e. it defines them purely on the basis of their logical properties. Of (...) the theories considered, this is the only one that satisfies all six of the requirements for an adequate ethical theory, and it also guarantees universalizability. Prescriptivity and, in particular, universal prescriptivity, enables us to examine moral intuitions objectively; furthermore, because the prescriptivity of moral statements is culturally invariant, it allows us to avoid relativism. (shrink)

Value‐words have their peculiar combination of descriptive and prescriptive meaning, Hare argues, because they are used for a specific purpose—to commend. To commend is not, however, to say something about a particular class of objects, but to make known to someone a standard for judging objects in this class in general—i.e. to guide her choice about objects in this class. Put in terms of Part I, to commend is to teach or decide on principles of choosing between objects of (...) a certain class. Consequently, value‐judgements share the characteristics of universal imperative sentences. (shrink)

Having discussed prescriptive language in Part I, Hare turns to value‐words in Parts II and III. He begins by arguing that though value‐words are ‘supervenient’ or ‘consequential’, they are so not as a matter of analytic entailment, e.g. because ‘good’ means ‘most conducive to pleasure’. Hare's argument for thus rebutting all forms of naturalism is that any definition of ‘good’ in this way would prevent us from commending something we want to commend.

Naturalism is a species of descriptivism, and is described as the proposal to specify the truth conditions of moral statements without reference to moral words, i.e. without reference to the attitudes of the speakers. Hence, the truth conditions of moral statements are non‐moral properties. Hare subdivides Naturalism into ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ varieties. The variety of Naturalism that interests Hare in this chapter is objectivist naturalism, according to which the non‐moral properties are objective. Naturalism, Hare argues, results inevitably (...) in relativism, and any ethical theory that implies relativism must be rejected. (shrink)

Philosophy of language, according to Hare, contributes significantly to ethics, because it provides a logical structure for moral thinking. Referring to J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, Hare distinguishes two kinds or genera of speech acts, the descriptive and the prescriptive; and he also discusses Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Moral judgements, e.g. those judgements expressed by ‘ought’, are prescriptive speech acts, but they also have a descriptive meaning. This is because moral judgements share with (...) normative judgements the logical feature Hare calls universalizability. Alongside prescriptivity and universalizability, a third element of Hare's account of moral judgement is the identification of one's will with that of another moral agent's will in hypothetical situations. (shrink)

Na primeira parte, argumento que o descritivismo proposto por Moritz Schlick não compreende adequadamente a função dos juízos morais. Na segunda parte, argumento que o emotivismo não apresenta uma explicação adequada para o papel da razão na ética. Na terceira parte, argumento que o prescritivismo universal proposto por R. M. Hare avança na solução dos problemas do emotivismo, porque amplia o papel da razão na ética, e na solução dos problemas do descritivismo, porque compreende a função dos juízos morais (...) na linguagem ordinária. The first part of this article argues that descriptivism as proposed by Moritz Schlick does not correctly understand the function of moral judgements. The second part argues that emotivism does not provide an adequate explanation of the role of reason in ethics. Finally, the article shows how the universal prescriptivism proposed by R. M. Hare furthers the solution of the problems of emotivism, since it extends the role of reason in ethics and in the resolution of the problems of descriptivism, given that it understands the function of moral judgements in ordinary language. (shrink)

I argue that, If one adopts a minimal naturalism (of a kind rejected by moore, Hare, "et al".), One would adopt a methodology which yields conclusions identical to that yielded by intuitionistic methodology (of a kind employed by ross, Prichard, "et al".). I dilate upon the advantages which thus accrue to each theory, And I defend my minimal naturalism against a variety of objections.

Na primeira parte, argumento que o descritivismo proposto por Moritz Schlick não compreende adequadamente a função dos juízos morais. Na segunda parte, argumen-to que o emotivismo não apresenta uma explicação adequada para o papel da razão na ética. Na terceira parte, argumento que o prescritivismo universal proposto por R. M. Hare avança na solução dos problemas do emotivismo, porque amplia o papel da razão na ética, e na solução dos problemas do descritivismo, porque compreende a função dos juízos morais (...) na linguagem ordinária. (shrink)

Drawing heavily on recent empirical research to update R.M. Hare's two-level utilitarianism and expand Hare's treatment of "intuitive level rules," Gary Varner considers in detail the theory's application to animals while arguing that Hare should have recognized a hierarchy of persons, near-persons, & the merely sentient.

Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by severe and frequent moral violations in multiple domains of life. Numerous studies have shown psychopathy-related limbic brain abnormalities during moral processing; however, these studies only examined negatively valenced moral stimuli. Here, we aimed to replicate prior psychopathy research on negative moral judgments and to extend this work by examining psychopathy-related abnormalities in the processing of controversial moral stimuli and positive moral processing. Incarcerated adult males (N = 245) completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging protocol (...) on a mobile imaging system stationed at the prison. Psychopathy was assessed using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R). Participants were then shown words describing three types of moral stimuli: wrong (e.g., stealing), not wrong (e.g., charity), and controversial (e.g., euthanasia). Participants rated each stimulus as either wrong or not wrong. PCL-R total scores were correlated with not wrong behavioral responses to wrong moral stimuli, and were inversely related to hemodynamic activity in the anterior cingulate cortex in the contrast of wrong > not wrong. In the controversial > noncontroversial comparison, psychopathy was inversely associated with activity in the temporal parietal junction and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results indicate that psychopathy-related abnormalities are observed during the processing of complex, negative, and positive moral stimuli. (shrink)

Bernard Williams charges that the moral psychology built into R. M. Hare’s utilitarianism is incoherent in virtue of demanding a bifurcated kind of moral thinking that is possible only for agents who fail to reflect properly on their own practical decision making. I mount a qualified defence of Hare’s view by drawing on the account of the ‘reactive attitudes’ found in P. F. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Against Williams, I argue that the ‘resilience’ of the reactive attitudes ensures (...) that our taking an instrumental view of our dispositions to experience guilt and compunction, as Hare calls for us to do while engaged in ‘critical’ moral thinking, will not prevent us from experiencing these feelings as people ordinarily do while we are thinking ‘intuitively’. I also consider the implications of my argument for consequentialism more generally and (briefly) Kantianism. (shrink)

This article studies one specific aspect of two of the most important contemporary ethical theories for the rational foundation of morals norms: R. M. Hare's universal prescriptivism, and the discursive ethics of the German philosopher Karl- Otto Apel. In this way, and bearing in mind the necessity of always establishing a mediation between the universal ethics of principles, and the concrete historical contexts of the communities which apply the aforementioned norms, this last question is studied in the theories of (...) both philosophers. In Hare's case, besides the inherent difficulty of the formalism he adopts, he cannot account for the problems indicated, inasmuch as, on the one hand, the incorporation of the utilitarianism that he proposes for this request is not justified and, on the other hand, with the method of interpersonal transferences, it is difficult to get to know the people's desires and interests, because of the impossibility of putting oneself in the other's place. As regards Apel, although he proposes a more coherent thesis, he does not in fact appropriately take into account the problems of the justification of decisions, and of the application of principles to historical situations. All these issues, pose the necessity of considering the feasibility of complementation with Habermas 's conception of discursive ethics.En este artículo se analiza un aspecto específico de dos de las más importantes teorías éticas contemporáneas para la fundamentación racional de las normas morales: el prescriptivismo universal de R.M. Hare, y la ética discursiva del filósofo alemán Karl- Otto Apel. Teniendo en cuenta la necesidad de establecer siempre una mediación entre la ética universal de principios, y los contextos históricos concretos de las comunidades que aplican dichas normas, se aborda esta última cuestión en las teorías de ambos filósofos. En el caso de Hare, además de la dificultad propia del formalismo que adopta, no puede dar cuenta de los problemas en cuestión en la medida en que, por un lado, la incorporación del utilitarismo que para este requerimiento propone no está justificada y, por el otro lado, con el procedimiento de las transferencias interpersonales es difícil conocer los deseos e intereses de las personas por la imposibilidad de ocupar el lugar del otro. En relación con Apel, el autor considera que, aunque propone una tesis más coherente, en realidad no tiene en cuenta adecuadamente los problemas de justificación de las decisiones y de la aplicación de los principios en las situaciones históricas. Lo antes mencionado plantea la necesidad de considerar la viabilidad de complementación con la concepción habermasiana de la ética discursiva. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyzed the discussion on the principle of universalizability which took place in moral philosophy in 1970–1980s. In short, I see two main problems that attracted more attention than others. The first problem is an opposition of universalizability and generalization. M.G. Singer argued for generalization argument, and R.M. Hare defended universalizability thesis. Hare tried to refute Singer’s position, using methods of ordinary language philosophy, and claimed that in ethics generalization is useless and misleading. I have (...) examined Singer’s defense and concluded that he was right and Hare was mistaken. Consequently, generalization argument is better in clarification of the relationship between universality and morality than Hare’s doctrine of universalizability, and hence the universality of moral principles is not incompatible with the existence of exclusions. The second problem is the substantiation of the application of categorical imperative in the theory of relevant act descriptions and accurate understanding of the difference between maxims and non-maxims. In Generalization in Ethics, Singer drew attention to this theme and philosophers have proposed some suggestions to solve this problem. I describe ideas of H.J. Paton, H. Potter, O. O’Neill and M. Timmons. Paton coined the teleological-law theory. According to Potter, the best criterion for the relevant act descriptions is causal one. O’N eill suggested the inconsistency-of-intention theory. Timmons defended the causal-law theory. My claim is that the teleological-law theory and the causal-law theory fail to solve the relevant act descriptions problem and the causal criterion and the inconsistency-of-intention theory have their limits. From this, I conclude that these approaches cannot be the basis for clarifying the connection between universality and morality, in contrast to Singer’s approach, which, therefore, is better than others to clarify the nature of universality in morality. (shrink)

Philosophical tradition sharply distinguishes the conditions under which belief and action are reasonable. This dissertation examines one attempt to sustain this division, namely, the Humean analysis of practical reasons. The Humean analysis divides practical reasons into end and means. The former concerns what one should pursue as goal. The latter, what one should do to realize one's ends. Humeans argue that end reasons are not subject to the conditions of reasonable belief. Since end reasons pick out what has value for (...) an agent, Humeans contend that what makes life meaningful lies largely outside epistemic criteria. I find that Humeans base this claim on two distinct arguments. Each assumes that end reasons are unfit for epistemic appraisal because they lack some feature owned by psychological states suited to epistemic appraisal. A psychological state is fit for epistemic assessment only if its attitude ascribes a truth value to its content and its content owns a truth value. I examine the first conjunct. Regarding , Humeans argue that all genuine end reasons move their agents and, thus, these reasons are wants or take wants as components, since desire is the only source of agent-motivation. But in desiring that p, one does not ascribe a truth-value to p. Thus, end reasons lie outside epistemic criteria, assuming that only those psychological states whose attitude ascribes a truth value to its content are fit for epistemic assessment. Among those who claim that end reasons are a type of conative psychological state in that all genuine end reasons must move their agents are: R. M. Hare, P. H. Nowell-Smith, Gilbert Harman, Donald Davidson, B. A. O. Williams, and Daniel Dennett. I argue that this appeal to motivation fails by examining when an actor is an agent, finding that these conditions do not require that all genuine end reasons motivate. I add that rational failings, such as weakness of will, strongly suggest that not all genuine end reasons motivate. I conclude that end reasons are best conceived as a type of belief and, thus, these reasons do not lie outside epistemic assessment due to their psychological attitude. (shrink)

Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)

Gil R, Arroyo-Anllo EM, Ingrand P, Gil M, Neau JP, Ornon C, Bonnaud V. Self-consciousness and Alzheimer’s disease. Acta Neurol Scand 2001: 104: 296–300. # Munksgaard 2001. Objectives – To propose a neuropsychological study of the various aspects of self-consciousness (SC) in Alzheimer’s disease. Methods – Forty-five patients with probable mild or moderate AD were included in the study. Severity of their dementia was assessed by the Mini Mental State (MMS). Fourteen questions were prepared to evaluate SC. Results – No (...) significant correlations were found between SC score and educational level, age, and duration of disease. A significant correlation was found between SC score and the severity of dementia, whereas frontal disturbances were just short of the significance threshold. The various aspects of SC were not impaired to the same degree. The most disturbed ones were awareness of cognitive deficiencies, moral judgements and prospective memory. The least disturbed aspects were awareness of identity and of mental representation of the body. Items relating to anosognosia and moral judgements were significantly correlated with the MMS score, whereas affective state, body representation disorders, prospective memory, and capacities for introspection were not related to the severity of the dementia. Consciousness of identity was sound, regardless of MMS score. Conclusions – AD clearly induces an heterogeneous impairment of SC. SC requires a convergence of many neural networks. In AD, neuronal alterations involve many cortical areas and information sent to the associative frontal cortex from memory, language and visuospatial areas is lacking or disturbed. Thus, the sequential order of successive stimuli cannot be maintained by the heteromodal associative cortex (dorsal convexity of the prefrontal cortex), and the supramodal associative cortex (located rostrally in the frontal lobes) is unable to provide reliable monitoring and assessment of simultaneous neural cognitive networks carrying insufficient and inadequate input. The core deficiency in AD patients might be impaired SC equated with the disability to maintain sequential and simultaneous ‘‘attention to life’’. The Self-Consciousness Questionnaire, a clinical scale providing multidimensional measurement, indicates that different aspects of consciousness are not correlated with overall cognitive deficiency as determined by the MMSE. (shrink)

The nine essays in this volume resulted from a symposium on "criminal justice and punishment" at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, in response to concerns about the workability and defensibility of any system of punishment. Among the contributors are Professors of Philosophy, Law, and Government, and the executive director of a Law Enforcement Commission. What emerges as the central focus of the book is a predominant interest in "retributivism." As J. B. Cederblom writes in the introduction, the retributive or (...) "just deserts" theory of punishment has come to dominate at the present time. The extent to which the retributivist position is promoted in opposition to an indistinct representation of utilitarianism, makes the book less challenging as a statement of the retributive position on punishment. Without a doubt, the more recent works of R. M. Hare and David Lyons, among others writing on utilitarian theory, do much to make easy claims against the theory appear facile if not naive. It is interesting that the bibliography does not refer to Hare’s work and mentions only one essay by Lyons. This is not to condemn the book, however, for it serves an important role in reawakening philosophers to the importance of a long-standing debate with a revived and healthy retributivism. But it is a warning that it is oftentimes too easy to defend a position when the opposition is not represented at the hearing. (shrink)

La cuestión práctica más importante del relativismo ético es sin duda la legitimidad de las valoraciones morales respecto a sociedades con sistemas morales diferentes del sistema de quien emite el juido de valor. El comunitarismo de la última década1 representado en esta cuestión por M. Walzer ha cuestionado precisamente dicha legitimidad y ha abogado por un «enfoque interno» que parta de los criterios de que toda forma de vida es «correcta» si sevive «de manera fiel a las concepciones compartidas por (...) los miembros de la comunidad en cuestión»2, considerando que «no atender a los significados compartidos por nuestra comunidad es siempre obrar injustamente»3. Este particularismo radical adopta así un «enfoque interno» en el que el hecho mismo de la aceptación de determinados puntos de vista, opiniones y principios forma parte de la argumentación en defensa de una concepción moral específica, en contra del «enfoque externo» que mantiene la necesidad de prescindir de estos hechos. En esta última línea Hare, por ejemplo, ha rechazado que pueda demostrarse la inaceptabiidad de una teoría moral alegando su no adecuación a la opinión admitida, pues «las opiniones morales vigentes en un grupo social no tienen valor probatorio alguno en una filosofía moral cuya función es establecer cuestiones morales de alcauce universal. (shrink)

This one-of-a-kind collection contains portraits of some of the most significant theological voices in modern medical ethics, including Paul Ramsey, James M. Gustafson, Richard McCormick, Bernard Haring, and Germain Grisez, about whom the authors and other contributors have written essays that point the way to a recovery of creative and faithful religious reflection on medical ethics.